By Bheki Mngomezulu
The 1994 first democratic election in South Africa was characterised by euphoria, especially among the black majority who were going to vote for the very first time.
The ANC emerged victorious with 62%. On May 10, 1994, Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first democratically elected president. Mandela led the Government of National Unity, which included other political parties such as the outgoing National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party.
Mandela’s Cabinet was a reflection of a negotiated settlement. De Klerk became the second deputy president with Thabo Mbeki being the first deputy. By all accounts, Mandela’s presidency was not characterised by too much power.
Actually, Mandela did not actively lead South Africa for five years. He allowed Mbeki to do the bulk of the work. When opposition political parties challenged him about this, he argued that he wanted to introduce Mbeki to the international community to ensure a smooth transition. In retrospect, and with the benefit of hindsight, Mandela achieved his goal.
When Mbeki assumed power in 1999, following the ANC’s second victory with 66%, South Africa experienced the first handover of power from one democratically elected leader to another.
Unlike Mandela, Mbeki was hands-on. He initiated a number of projects in South Africa but more across Africa. Working with his Nigerian counterpart, President Olusegun Obasanjo, they propagated the idea of the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development.
This also birthed the African Peer Review Mechanism. One of the distinguishing features of Mbeki’s administration was the strengthening of the office of the Presidency.
Section 84 of the Constitution outlines the powers and functions of the President. But Sections 91 and 92 focus on the Cabinet and the functions of Cabinet ministers. When several ministries are combined or the functions of ministers taken over by the presidency, this raises eyebrows and invokes the question: Is the country moving towards a “Super Presidency”? There are divergent views on this.
When former president Jacob Zuma assumed office after the 2009 election, expectations were high on what would characterise his presidency. Among other things, Zuma added new ministries and appointed new ministers.
While this was applauded by some who interpreted it as one way of ensuring that services reached the people, others cried foul. They argued that this was going to result in more money being wasted in paying ministers as opposed to delivering services to the people. But what became a real concern was the feeling that Zuma’s presidency was consolidating more power than during Mbeki’s era.
Rightly or wrongly so, there was a cry about South Africa tilting towards the “Super Presidency” syndrome. Even in instances where ministries were left to operate separately from the presidency, concerns were raised that some ministers were only warming the seats while real decisions were being taken at the Presidency.
Ministers in the Security Cluster were identified as some of those ministers who were there but had very little or nothing to do since the bulk of decision-making process happened at the Presidency.
After many unsuccessful attempts to invoke Section 89 of the Constitution to impeach Zuma, factionalism within the ANC saw the party doing what opposition parties had frantically tried to achieve but to no success. As it had done with Mbeki in September 2008, the ANC gave Zuma an ultimatum.
He had to resign or face impeachment from his own political party. Zuma tried to resist this unbecoming behaviour but eventually gave in and duly resigned. Unlike in 2008 when Kgalema Motlanthe became the caretaker president following the recall of Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa could not wait.
He assumed office immediately after Zuma’s resignation in February 2018. By the time South Africa held its scheduled election in May 2019, Ramaphosa had already been the president for more than a year. Since becoming president, Ramaphosa has faced many challenges.
These include, but are not limited, to, slow growth of the economy, the rise in unemployment, increase in crime statistics, the evident mushrooming of civil unrest and the Covid-19 pandemic. What has also become apparent is President Ramaphosa’s attempt to consolidate power.
When the riots linked to the controversial incarceration of Zuma happened, the president responded in a way which many (myself included) did not anticipate. Instead of addressing weaknesses at the State Security Agency (SSA), Ramaphosa took this department and placed it in the Presidency.
Ramaphosa has placed more power in his office – arguing that he wants to ensure efficiency. But if it was wrong for Zuma to control the SSA as alleged, is it not worse to kill the ministry and place it in the Presidency? When that happens, is South Africa not tilting towards the “Super Presidency” syndrome? These are pertinent questions which the country needs to ruminate about.
* Bheki Mngomezulu is a Professor of Political Science and the Deputy Dean of Research at the University of the Western Cape
